New design USA flag coming?

[Roadgeekteen]

Every admission of a new state has involved immense amounts of horsetrading, power politics and fine timing going all the way back to state #14 (Vermont), and I would expect this one to be no different.

I have thought about places like Guam, American Samoa and so forth every now and then and the best solution that I came up with in my mind was to gather all of the USA islands in the Pacific Ocean that are not now a part of any existing state and create a (for lack of a better name) 'State of Pacifica'.  Capitol to be in HagÃ¥tña, GU and each of the existing territories would be counties in that state.

Mike

The issue is that Puerto Rico is just so sizable.  If it were a state, it would rank between Connecticut and Utah population wise.

The Pacific Territories (Samoa, Guam, Mariana Islands), even if you combined all of them, would have a population less than half of Wyoming.  (The other issue is that culturally, Samoa as a Polynesian nation is different that Guam and the Mariana Islands as Micronesian nations.)

You could fold the Virgin Islands in to Puerto Rico too.

But there is no harm in simply keeping them as territories.

Fold them into Hawaii, distances will suck but what can you do. Or keep them as territories and give them limited reps in congress, like one senator, one house rep, and one electoral vote.

I really don't even know if giving them reps in Congress is necessary.  In Puerto Rico's case, you are taking about 3 million people.  The pacific islands, 200,000.

Maybe no reps, but one combined electoral vote. Wyoming has 3, and the pacific territories combined are about half the size of Wyoming.

[SP Cook]

Another option for DC to grant them some representation in Congress beyond the current non-voting delegate.  For instance, give them an actual voting member in Congress and simultaneously increase the House to 437 members.  I know this was debated at least in committee about a decade ago because the state that would have benefitted from another extra member would have been Utah, which would have liklely been a Republican district.

I believe they could do this with a simple bill and not a constitutional amendment.

If you wanted to get really weird, you could do an amendment that not only gives them a member of Congress, but also gives them one Senator.  But not not official statehood.

Unconstitutional. 

Article I.
Section. 2.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Section. 3.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State...

ONLY STATES can have votes in either the House or the Senate.  Non-states cannot. 

[SEWIGuy]

Another option for DC to grant them some representation in Congress beyond the current non-voting delegate.  For instance, give them an actual voting member in Congress and simultaneously increase the House to 437 members.  I know this was debated at least in committee about a decade ago because the state that would have benefitted from another extra member would have been Utah, which would have liklely been a Republican district.

I believe they could do this with a simple bill and not a constitutional amendment.

If you wanted to get really weird, you could do an amendment that not only gives them a member of Congress, but also gives them one Senator.  But not not official statehood.

Unconstitutional. 

Article I.
Section. 2.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Section. 3.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State...

ONLY STATES can have votes in either the House or the Senate.  Non-states cannot. 

It's not unconstitutional if it is done via Constitutional amendment....which is why I noted it might be necessary in the first case.

[kphoger]

Another option for DC to grant them some representation in Congress beyond the current non-voting delegate.  For instance, give them an actual voting member in Congress and simultaneously increase the House to 437 members.  I know this was debated at least in committee about a decade ago because the state that would have benefitted from another extra member would have been Utah, which would have liklely been a Republican district.

I believe they could do this with a simple bill and not a constitutional amendment.

If you wanted to get really weird, you could do an amendment that not only gives them a member of Congress, but also gives them one Senator.  But not not official statehood.

Unconstitutional. 

Article I.
Section. 2.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Section. 3.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State...

ONLY STATES can have votes in either the House or the Senate.  Non-states cannot. 

It's not unconstitutional if it is done via Constitutional amendment....which is why I noted it might be necessary in the first case.

I'm not sure that can be done for the Senate even by constitutional amendment, unless all fifty States agreed to it.  Article V of the Constitution–with the words "no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate"–shields Article I Section 3 from amendment.  Any change to the number of Senators that still retains equality of representation between the States could be adopted as an Amendment if ratified by three-fourths of the States.  However, admitting non-State representation into the Senate would change the equality of suffrage for all the existing fifty member States and would therefore require unanimous ratification.  For example, if DC were represented by a Senator, then each State's representation in the Senate would decrease from ²/₁₀₀ to ²/₁₀₁.

However, there is some debate about it.  Specifically, States' "equal suffrage in the Senate" could be interpreted to mean not that each State's representation equal ¹/_x assuming x number of constituent entities, but rather only that each State have the same representation as each of the other constituent States.  Thus, if DC were granted a Senator, it could be said that each State's suffrage would remain equal because all fifty would have the same  ²/₁₀₁ representation, and therefore Article V would not have been violated.

It's a tricky question.

[SEWIGuy]

Another option for DC to grant them some representation in Congress beyond the current non-voting delegate.  For instance, give them an actual voting member in Congress and simultaneously increase the House to 437 members.  I know this was debated at least in committee about a decade ago because the state that would have benefitted from another extra member would have been Utah, which would have liklely been a Republican district.

I believe they could do this with a simple bill and not a constitutional amendment.

If you wanted to get really weird, you could do an amendment that not only gives them a member of Congress, but also gives them one Senator.  But not not official statehood.

Unconstitutional. 

Article I.
Section. 2.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Section. 3.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State...

ONLY STATES can have votes in either the House or the Senate.  Non-states cannot. 

It's not unconstitutional if it is done via Constitutional amendment....which is why I noted it might be necessary in the first case.

I'm not sure that can be done for the Senate even by constitutional amendment, unless all fifty States agreed to it.  Article V of the Constitution–with the words "no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate"–shields Article I Section 3 from amendment.  Any change to the number of Senators that still retains equality of representation between the States could be adopted as an Amendment if ratified by three-fourths of the States.  However, admitting non-State representation into the Senate would change the equality of suffrage for all the existing fifty member States and would therefore require unanimous ratification.  For example, if DC were represented by a Senator, then each State's representation in the Senate would decrease from ²/₁₀₀ to ²/₁₀₁.

However, there is some debate about it.  Specifically, States' "equal suffrage in the Senate" could be interpreted to mean not that each State's representation equal ¹/_x assuming x number of constituent entities, but rather only that each State have the same representation as each of the other constituent States.  Thus, if DC were granted a Senator, it could be said that each State's suffrage would remain equal because all fifty would have the same  ²/₁₀₁ representation, and therefore Article V would not have been violated.

It's a tricky question.

No part of the Constitution is shielded from the amendment process.  Article V can be amended just as well, and any proposed amendment could take care of the issues you raise above.

[kphoger]

No part of the Constitution is shielded from the amendment process.  Article V can be amended just as well, and any proposed amendment could take care of the issues you raise above.

To claim that the part of the Constitution outlining its process of amendment can itself be amended is not necessarily true.

I suggest reading this commentary on Article V, a portion of which I quote below:

The second unamendable provision shows how seriously the smaller states were committed to protecting the "original federal design."  Its sponsor was Roger Sherman of Connecticut, architect of what is often called the Connecticut Compromise or "the Great Compromise,"  whereby states were to be represented proportionally in the House and equally in the Senate. Two days before the convention ended, on September 15, Sherman "expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate."  He therefore proposed language barring amending the Constitution to deprive states of their equal suffrage. When his motion failed, Sherman indicated how profoundly concerned he was by proposing the elimination of Article V altogether. This motion also failed, but it prompted Gouverneur Morris to propose the language ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Convention. As James Madison wrote in his notes, "This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question saying no."

[CtrlAltDel]

No part of the Constitution is shielded from the amendment process.  Article V can be amended just as well, and any proposed amendment could take care of the issues you raise above.

To claim that the part of the Constitution outlining its process of amendment can itself be amended is not necessarily true.

I suggest reading this commentary on Article V, a portion of which I quote below:

The second unamendable provision shows how seriously the smaller states were committed to protecting the “original federal design.” Its sponsor was Roger Sherman of Connecticut, architect of what is often called the Connecticut Compromise or “the Great Compromise,” whereby states were to be represented proportionally in the House and equally in the Senate. Two days before the convention ended, on September 15, Sherman “expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate.” He therefore proposed language barring amending the Constitution to deprive states of their equal suffrage. When his motion failed, Sherman indicated how profoundly concerned he was by proposing the elimination of Article V altogether. This motion also failed, but it prompted Gouverneur Morris to propose the language ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Convention. As James Madison wrote in his notes, “This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question saying no.”

I know I'm going to regret getting into this, but this article doesn't seem to give a legal reason as to why the entrenchment clause can't be amended. Rather, it states that doing so would change the nature of the union, but there have been a number of amendments that have done so, in particular the Fourteenth. Moreover, so far as I can tell, the citation from Texas v. White only asserts that the federal government can step in to avert the destruction of the indestructible union of the states, which is no surprise given that Texas v. White is the legal manifestation of, shall we say, Grant v. Lee, which has nothing to with the composition of the Senate.

A better argument, I think, would center on how any entrenchment clause is more or less meaningless if it can be amended, since that goes against the nature of what an entrenchment clause is.

[SEWIGuy]

No part of the Constitution is shielded from the amendment process.  Article V can be amended just as well, and any proposed amendment could take care of the issues you raise above.

To claim that the part of the Constitution outlining its process of amendment can itself be amended is not necessarily true.

I suggest reading this commentary on Article V, a portion of which I quote below:

The second unamendable provision shows how seriously the smaller states were committed to protecting the "original federal design."  Its sponsor was Roger Sherman of Connecticut, architect of what is often called the Connecticut Compromise or "the Great Compromise,"  whereby states were to be represented proportionally in the House and equally in the Senate. Two days before the convention ended, on September 15, Sherman "expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate."  He therefore proposed language barring amending the Constitution to deprive states of their equal suffrage. When his motion failed, Sherman indicated how profoundly concerned he was by proposing the elimination of Article V altogether. This motion also failed, but it prompted Gouverneur Morris to propose the language ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Convention. As James Madison wrote in his notes, "This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question saying no."

I know I'm going to regret getting into this, but this article doesn't seem to give a legal reason as to why the entrenchment clause can't be amended. Rather, it states that doing so would change the nature of the union, but there have been a number of amendments that have done so, in particular the Fourteenth. Moreover, so far as I can tell, the citation from Texas v. White only asserts that the federal government can step in to avert the destruction of the indestructible union of the states, which is no surprise given that Texas v. White is the legal manifestation of, shall we say, Grant v. Lee, which has nothing to with the composition of the Senate.

A better argument, I think, would center on how any entrenchment clause is more or less meaningless if it can be amended, since that goes against the nature of what an entrenchment clause is.

Exactly.  If the founders didn't want Article V to be amended, they could have shielded it from Amendment.  But they didn't. 

https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&context=lsfp

"Political actors could use Article V first to amend the Equal Suffrage Clause either
by repealing it or modifying it, and then second to diminish a state's equal suffrage without its
consent.72 This double amendment procedure is admittedly a "sly scheme,"  writes Akhil Amar
but it would nonetheless "have satisfied the literal text of Article V and would also have
comported with the Constitution's general principle of ongoing popular sovereignty."

[kphoger]

Exactly.  If the founders didn't want Article V to be amended, they could have shielded it from Amendment.  But they didn't. 

https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&context=lsfp

"Political actors could use Article V first to amend the Equal Suffrage Clause either
by repealing it or modifying it, and then second to diminish a state's equal suffrage without its
consent.72 This double amendment procedure is admittedly a "sly scheme,"  writes Akhil Amar
but it would nonetheless "have satisfied the literal text of Article V and would also have
comported with the Constitution's general principle of ongoing popular sovereignty."

Of course, the article you cited claims immediately prior to the quoted portion that such is a "design flaw" and goes against the "intention" of the framers.

This design law [sic] creates the possibility of amending the entrenching clause in order to circumvent the intended entrenchment.

[SEWIGuy]

Exactly.  If the founders didn't want Article V to be amended, they could have shielded it from Amendment.  But they didn't. 

https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&context=lsfp

"Political actors could use Article V first to amend the Equal Suffrage Clause either
by repealing it or modifying it, and then second to diminish a state's equal suffrage without its
consent.72 This double amendment procedure is admittedly a "sly scheme,"  writes Akhil Amar
but it would nonetheless "have satisfied the literal text of Article V and would also have
comported with the Constitution's general principle of ongoing popular sovereignty."

Of course, the article you cited claims immediately prior to the quoted portion that such is a "design flaw" and goes against the "intention" of the framers.

This design law [sic] creates the possibility of amending the entrenching clause in order to circumvent the intended entrenchment.

Well, he calls it a "design flaw."  But he really offers no attribution that their intent was to make Article V unamendable. 

[kphoger]

But see the reference I posted earlier to the Connecticut Compromise.

[michravera]

Exactly.  If the founders didn't want Article V to be amended, they could have shielded it from Amendment.  But they didn't. 

https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&context=lsfp

"Political actors could use Article V first to amend the Equal Suffrage Clause either
by repealing it or modifying it, and then second to diminish a state's equal suffrage without its
consent.72 This double amendment procedure is admittedly a "sly scheme,"  writes Akhil Amar
but it would nonetheless "have satisfied the literal text of Article V and would also have
comported with the Constitution's general principle of ongoing popular sovereignty."

Of course, the article you cited claims immediately prior to the quoted portion that such is a "design flaw" and goes against the "intention" of the framers.

This design law [sic] creates the possibility of amending the entrenching clause in order to circumvent the intended entrenchment.

Well, he calls it a "design flaw."  But he really offers no attribution that their intent was to make Article V unamendable.

There is precedent (the original "Territories Northwest of the river Ohio" Act) for permitting territories to send representatives to congress without admitting them as a state or permitting senators. As I recall, most of the territories thus created were admitted as states within a relatively short period of time, so the issue of the Electoral vote either never came up or did so only briefly.

We could certainly, probably just by statute (majority of both houses and presidential assent), change the territorial terms of any of the territories to give them actual votes in the House. I believe that, technically, any such proposal would require approval of the relevant territorial legislature and governor or a referendum to to the people of the territory, but no one really thinks that they would say "no" to congressional representation. The question would be along the lines of "how fast can we assemble the legislature to get it approved and on the governor's desk and do you think that we should drag the governor out of bed to sign it or should we let him sleep until 6AM or call an 11AM new conference? and, after that, how fast can we notify the Secretary of State that we have approved it?!"

[oscar]

There is precedent (the original "Territories Northwest of the river Ohio" Act) for permitting territories to send representatives to congress without admitting them as a state or permitting senators. As I recall, most of the territories thus created were admitted as states within a relatively short period of time, so the issue of the Electoral vote either never came up or did so only briefly.

AIUI, the Northwest Ordinance made provisions for territorial non-voting representatives in the House once the population of a territory met a threshold, followed by a request for statehood if a higher threshold is met, which if (and only if) it was granted would then give the new state full representation in the House and the Senate.

The earlier stage of the process is pretty much where D.C. is now. D.C.'s delegate to the House has substantial voting powers, including in committee, but stopping short of letting her cast a deciding vote on the passage of legislation (she can cast a vote on legislation in the "Committee of the Whole", but then the House re-votes on final passage without her or other delegates, so her vote never really counts). Her voting rights are tweaked up or down depending on which party controls the House, but even when Republicans control the House she still has some clout. D.C. also elects two "shadow Senators". They are a total joke, with no formal role in how the Senate operates, and about zero power or influence no matter what party controls the Senate.

[kkt]

Requiring more than 51% agreement on anything, in my opinion, is a good thing.  It makes for a greater likelihood that the minority won't be trampled on by the majority, and also that actual compromise will be accomplished.

I agree, especially for confirming judicial appointees.  For legislation, and cabinet and executive branch appointees, I might be more inclined to let it go as the next president can get rid of them or the next congress can repeal them.  But Federal judicial appointees are for life, and as a separate branch of government they should have judges who are near the center of American political thought, not the extremes.

Actually I wish the nuclear option had never been invoked.  While it may look attractive for the majority party, it's clearly not in the spirit of the Senate rules as they were intended to work.  And any dirty trick the majority party pulls on the minority party will be done back to them and harder when the majority flips.

Or the Senate could go back to the old rule, that a filibuster needs one senator to actually keep talking if they wanted to keep a vote from being called.  It sounds extreme because it allows just one senator to block all business, however actual filibusters were rarely more than a day before the need for food, sleep, or a bathroom break became irresistable.

[STLmapboy]

with the whole red/blue divide it would only ever happen with another red state being added

Couldn't it happen if the Democrats take back the senate?

A simple majority is not enough. You'd have to have a 2/3 majority, which is not happening in the House or the Senate anytime soon, for either party.

...
Admitting a new state only requires the assent of a majority of each house of congress, no presidential signature needed (see: Article. IV., Section. 3., Constitution of the United States of America).

Maybe I'm misunderstanding. So making DC a state could easily be done with a simple majority, and would not require a constitutional amendment?

Not DC, but I don't see why Puerto Rico can't happen. If they want it, it seems like a golden opportunity for the dems if they ever get the majority back.

Meaningful legislation hasn't advanced under either party's control. This owes largely to the PR government's awful fiscal condition; it is an Illinois-style quasi-bankruptcy with enormous out-migration. In fact, population loss rate is highest in the nation, 5x more than second-place West Virginia.

[hotdogPi]

In fact, population loss rate is highest in the nation, 5x more than second-place West Virginia.

That was because of the hurricane.

[Roadgeekteen]

Requiring more than 51% agreement on anything, in my opinion, is a good thing.  It makes for a greater likelihood that the minority won't be trampled on by the majority, and also that actual compromise will be accomplished.

I agree, especially for confirming judicial appointees.  For legislation, and cabinet and executive branch appointees, I might be more inclined to let it go as the next president can get rid of them or the next congress can repeal them.  But Federal judicial appointees are for life, and as a separate branch of government they should have judges who are near the center of American political thought, not the extremes.

Actually I wish the nuclear option had never been invoked.  While it may look attractive for the majority party, it's clearly not in the spirit of the Senate rules as they were intended to work.  And any dirty trick the majority party pulls on the minority party will be done back to them and harder when the majority flips.

Or the Senate could go back to the old rule, that a filibuster needs one senator to actually keep talking if they wanted to keep a vote from being called.  It sounds extreme because it allows just one senator to block all business, however actual filibusters were rarely more than a day before the need for food, sleep, or a bathroom break became irresistable.

Our political system is so radical that moderate judges might never be confirmed because both parties hate each other.

[SP Cook]

As to the out-migration from PR, certainly the hurricane is a factor, but most people leaving PR are doing so for the same reason people have migrated for centuries, leaving places of lower opportunity for ones higher.  While PR's quality of life is high by Caribbean standards, it is well below even the poorest states, and a dysfunctional local government keeps it that way.  As full citizens (of a country where Spanish is no nearly the barrier it was even a generation ago) Puerto Ricans with ambition and ability seek other parts of their country with better governments, infrastructure, and economies.

[Scott5114]

So what exactly is the underlying cause of Puerto Rico's government being more dysfunctional than a state government?

[SEWIGuy]

Puero Rico has a lot of problems.  The Jones Act.  Terrible budget management.  Many of those who have the ability leave for better economic circumstances.  Statehood would likely need to come with the assumption of their debt, which would be beneficial for them but wouldn't cost the US much in comparison.

[STLmapboy]

In fact, population loss rate is highest in the nation, 5x more than second-place West Virginia.

That was because of the hurricane.

It's been shedding people since long before the hurricane. Early 2000s at least.

[michravera]

Requiring more than 51% agreement on anything, in my opinion, is a good thing.  It makes for a greater likelihood that the minority won't be trampled on by the majority, and also that actual compromise will be accomplished.

I agree, especially for confirming judicial appointees.  For legislation, and cabinet and executive branch appointees, I might be more inclined to let it go as the next president can get rid of them or the next congress can repeal them.  But Federal judicial appointees are for life, and as a separate branch of government they should have judges who are near the center of American political thought, not the extremes.

Actually I wish the nuclear option had never been invoked.  While it may look attractive for the majority party, it's clearly not in the spirit of the Senate rules as they were intended to work.  And any dirty trick the majority party pulls on the minority party will be done back to them and harder when the majority flips.

Or the Senate could go back to the old rule, that a filibuster needs one senator to actually keep talking if they wanted to keep a vote from being called.  It sounds extreme because it allows just one senator to block all business, however actual filibusters were rarely more than a day before the need for food, sleep, or a bathroom break became irresistable.

The original "nuclear option" was used to pass the "Affordable Care Act". There were enough Republican senators at the time that opposed bringing it to a vote (and more subsequently elected) that a filibuster could have lasted until the present time.

The parliamentary device used to continue a filibuster beyond the time between bathroom breaks is known as the "Quorum Call". A quorum call is always in order and usually gives a 10 or 15 minute break. During the Senate debate on one of the Civil Rights acts, one senator (Strom Thurmond {who was a Democrat at the time, like most of those opposed to the legislation}, I believe) got up and spoke for 24 hours without resuming his seat. This gave time for the other senators involved in the filibuster to organize. Every two hours, just as it would be time for a bathroom break and a reasonable amount of time between quorum calls, a well-rested senator showed up ready to speak. He had no quorum calls to answer and would have been pleased if a quorum had not been present. There were about a dozen Southern Democrat senators involved in the filibuster, so each could speak for 2 hours and then go have a beer and get some rest while the rest of the senators {wanting to break the filibuster} had to stay close enough to the Senate floor to answer a quorum call. The group running the filibuster eventually got some concessions.

The invocation of "Cloture" once required a two-thirds vote. It was changed to three-fifths in about 1980 or so. Once cloture is invoked, it isn't the end of debate, but it becomes limited to 100 hours (probably one hour per senator), so they schedule a vote on the fifth day following its invocation.

When my party is in majority in the Senate, the filibuster is an outmoded, backward, anti-democratic throwback to a day when only the elite could rule. When my party is in the minority in the Senate, the filibuster is the last protection against divisive, unwise, and oppressive legislation.

[hotdogPi]

The original "nuclear option" was used to pass the "Affordable Care Act".

The ACA passed 60-39.

[michravera]

The original "nuclear option" was used to pass the "Affordable Care Act".

The ACA passed 60-39.

Maybe on the final vote, but not on the procedural vote to end debate.

[SEWIGuy]

The original "nuclear option" was used to pass the "Affordable Care Act".

The ACA passed 60-39.

Maybe on the final vote, but not on the procedural vote to end debate.

The vote to end debate passed by the same exact vote.