Key Bridge (Round Who Knows But Probably Not Last)

[Rothman]

Ok... I've probably asked this before, but what do y'all think are the chances this WON'T get rebuilt and instead go down the path of Texas SH-87 and the like? The cost keeps absolutely ballooning...

Zilch.

(Did you read the thread?)

[ElishaGOtis]

Ok... I've probably asked this before, but what do y'all think are the chances this WON'T get rebuilt and instead go down the path of Texas SH-87 and the like? The cost keeps absolutely ballooning...

Zilch.

(Did you read the thread?)

I did, but it seems like the process keeps getting mothballed one way or another... even with the 70% design...

[Beltway]

Ok... I've probably asked this before, but what do y'all think are the chances this WON'T get rebuilt and instead go down the path of Texas SH-87 and the like? The cost keeps absolutely ballooning...

The chance of non‑replacement is zero. The chance of replacement before ~2037-2042 is a separate question, and that timeline remains long because the federal process (EIS/ROD - final design - construction) cannot be shortcut. SH-87 is irrelevant, and so is the idea that this will be rebuilt quickly.

This is the same category as the Hampton Roads Third Crossing: inevitable in the long‑range sense, but undefined in the programmatic sense. Replacement and timely replacement are two different questions, and nothing in the current record changes the gating items.

[Rothman]

Ok... I've probably asked this before, but what do y'all think are the chances this WON'T get rebuilt and instead go down the path of Texas SH-87 and the like? The cost keeps absolutely ballooning...

Zilch.

(Did you read the thread?)

I did, but it seems like the process keeps getting mothballed one way or another... even with the 70% design...

How'd they get 70% of the design done if it was mothballed? ;D

[Beltway]

Texas SH‑87 was abandoned because coastal erosion physically destroyed the roadway and made maintenance geotechnically impossible. It was a low‑volume coastal spur with no national economic role. It has no relevance to a major interstate‑class replacement project.

[vdeane]

tl:dr - Beltway is bored and they must scream

I don't know why we let them have a mouth.

So he can pontificate about the people of New Orleans and how sudden rapid increases in sea level should be described.

[Max Rockatansky]

tl:dr - Beltway is bored and they must scream

I don't know why we let them have a mouth.

So he can pontificate about the people of New Orleans and how sudden rapid increases in sea level should be described.

I thought you folks were going to reference the Great Soft Jelly Thing and the Harlan Ellison story I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream.

[The Ghostbuster]

Are you guys trying to get this thread locked as well? How many times must we do this?

[Max Rockatansky]

Are you guys trying to get this thread locked as well? How many times must we do this?

Regarding which comments?  The book I just referenced is top notch sci-fi.  The 1990s point and click PC adaptation was somehow even more grim.

[NE2]

tl:dr - Beltway is bored and they must scream

I don't know why we let them have a mouth.

So he can pontificate about the people of New Orleans and how sudden rapid increases in sea level should be described.

I thought you folks were going to reference the Great Soft Jelly Thing and the Harlan Ellison story I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream.

That is what I was going for.

[Max Rockatansky]

tl:dr - Beltway is bored and they must scream

I don't know why we let them have a mouth.

So he can pontificate about the people of New Orleans and how sudden rapid increases in sea level should be described.

I thought you folks were going to reference the Great Soft Jelly Thing and the Harlan Ellison story I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream.

That is what I was going for.

Beltway certainly would be way more interesting if he secretly was the Allied Mastercomputer.

[Beltway]

Here's some additional background on the original Outer Harbor Crossing plan, which predates the 1972–77 Key Bridge contract.

The first concept was a single‑tube, two‑lane, 6,200‑foot harbor tunnel with long approach causeways built in advance to reach the portals. The two‑lane freeway was placed under construction, and the tidal‑water causeways were completed between 1968 and 1970. When the tunnel contract was advertised on July 30, 1970, the bids came in high enough that the State Roads Commission determined a four‑lane high‑level bridge could be built for roughly the same cost as the revised tunnel estimate.

The long approach causeways -- about 1.1 miles on the north side and roughly 3,000 feet on the south -- were not part of the later Key Bridge contract. They were advance earthwork for the earlier tunnel concept and required placing large volumes of imported borrow fill directly into tidal water. The Patapsco bottom in this area consisted of soft organic sediments similar to the "black mayonnaise" later encountered on the Fort McHenry Tunnel project, so the work used containment berms, staged lifts, settlement allowances, wide embankment bases, and heavy riprap along both shorelines.

Material sourcing reflected the site conditions. On the south side, a large upland sand pit only about 3,000 feet from the alignment almost certainly supplied most of the fill. On the north side, where no borrow pits existed, the contractor would have barged sand across the Patapsco and placed it behind temporary berms -- a standard Maryland method for tidal embankments of that era. This allowed the mile‑long north causeway to be built entirely on soft tidal soils without relying on long‑haul trucking or unstable temporary access roads.

No published contract cost survives, but the geometry and construction methods indicate a major earthwork and shoreline‑protection job involving roughly 1.0–1.3 million cubic yards of placed material and costing on the order of $2.2–$2.5 million in 1968 dollars (about $18–$22 million today).

The bridge approach spans were built on the causeways.

[kphoger]

Texas SH‑87 ... was a low‑volume coastal spur with no national economic role. It has no relevance to a major interstate‑class replacement project.

A national economic role?  A major interstate-class replacement?

Wow, you sure have changed your opinion since...

it is not a "nationally significant bridge."

Local access. Important to Maryland. Not national importance.

Besides, 695 East was not officially an Interstate highway until Maryland gamed the system in 2024.

[The Ghostbuster]

Charges are being filed against the operators and a manager responsible for the 2024 bridge collapse: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ship-operators-involved-baltimore-bridge-collapse-charged-misconduct-o-rcna344687.

[Beltway]

You're mixing functional classification with project‑scale classification. My earlier comments were about the 1977 bridge's role; the current discussion is about the scale of the replacement project. Those are different contexts, so pulling quotes across them doesn't create a contradiction.

[kphoger]

Those are different contexts, so pulling quotes across them doesn't create a contradiction.

So, in your world, a national economic role is not nationally significant?

[1995hoo]

Apparently the State of Maryland has reached a $2.25 billion settlement with the company that owned and operated the ship.

[kphoger]

Apparently the State of Maryland has reached a $2.25 billion settlement with the company that owned and operated the ship.

... a new bridge is slated to be open in 2030, according to Maryland offiials [sic].

*triggered*

[Rothman]

Apparently the State of Maryland has reached a $2.25 billion settlement with the company that owned and operated the ship.

How convenient.

(It's never that simple)

[Beltway]

Maryland's $2.25 billion settlement covers economic losses -- toll revenue, port disruption, emergency costs -- not the cost of a new bridge. It doesn't change the NEPA reset, the funding gap, or the stalled project.

The $2.25 billion is compensation for past economic harm, not capital funding. FHWA rules prohibit using damage settlements as bridge money, MDTA can't spend it without a new appropriation, and the project isn't even through NEPA. The settlement doesn't fund the rebuild.

The original $1.7–1.9 billion estimate was reasonable before the procurement collapsed. The current $8–9 billion range reflects the extreme‑risk profile created by MDTA's own schedule, design, and contracting decisions -- and that higher risk band is what the market will price.

The settlement stabilizes Maryland's finances, but it doesn't revive the bridge project. The rebuild still requires a full NEPA process, a new procurement, and a multi‑billion‑dollar federal funding package that does not exist.

[Rothman]

The $2.25 billion is compensation for past economic harm, not capital funding. FHWA rules prohibit using damage settlements as bridge money

*citation needed*

MDTA can't spend it without a new appropriation

AI gobbledegook.

the project isn't even through NEPA

Absolutely incorrect:

https://mdta.maryland.gov/blog-category/mdta-news-releases/francis-scott-key-bridge-rebuild-moves-ahead-federal-environmental

ETA:  But yeah, I'm sure MD will find another way to spend the money...

[Beltway]

On the FHWA damage‑recovery rules:
23 CFR 668.105 and 668.113 require third‑party damage recoveries to be credited back to the category of loss they compensated. They cannot be reclassified as capital construction funds or used as state match on a new federal‑aid project. FHWA treats them as offsets, not new money. That's the governing regulation, not "AI gobbledegook."

On MDTA and appropriations:
MDTA is a revenue‑bond authority. It cannot spend general‑fund settlement proceeds without a legislative appropriation, a bond resolution, and federal concurrence. None of those exist. That's Maryland budget law.

On the NEPA status:
The link provided is MDTA's 2024 Notice of Intent press release. A Notice of Intent is the beginning of the NEPA process, not the end. A project is "through NEPA" only when an Environmental Assessment or EIS is completed and a FONSI or Record of Decision is issued. The Key Bridge replacement has none of those; it is at the NOI/scoping stage. Calling that "through NEPA" is incorrect.

Bottom line:
The settlement is backward‑looking compensation for economic losses. The replacement bridge is a forward‑looking capital project that still requires NEPA, design, procurement, and a federal funding package that does not exist. The two cannot be merged under federal law.

[Rothman]

On the FHWA damage‑recovery rules:
23 CFR 668.105 and 668.113 require third‑party damage recoveries to be credited back to the category of loss they compensated. They cannot be reclassified as capital construction funds or used as state match on a new federal‑aid project. FHWA treats them as offsets, not new money. That's the governing regulation, not "AI gobbledegook."

On MDTA and appropriations:
MDTA is a revenue‑bond authority. It cannot spend general‑fund settlement proceeds without a legislative appropriation, a bond resolution, and federal concurrence. None of those exist. That's Maryland budget law.

On the NEPA status:
The link provided is MDTA's 2024 Notice of Intent press release. A Notice of Intent is the beginning of the NEPA process, not the end. A project is "through NEPA" only when an Environmental Assessment or EIS is completed and a FONSI or Record of Decision is issued. The Key Bridge replacement has none of those; it is at the NOI/scoping stage. Calling that "through NEPA" is incorrect.

Bottom line:
The settlement is backward‑looking compensation for economic losses. The replacement bridge is a forward‑looking capital project that still requires NEPA, design, procurement, and a federal funding package that does not exist. The two cannot be merged under federal law.

More AI gobbledegook.

Here's 668.105, which says nothing about third-party compensation and is only about ER fund use:

https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-23/chapter-I/subchapter-G/part-668/subpart-A/section-668.105

Here's 668.113, which says nothing about third-party compensation:

https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-23/chapter-I/subchapter-G/part-668/subpart-A/section-668.113

(Even if this was a rule, what MD could do is get a TIFIA loan and use the settlement money to pay it off, Mario Cuomo Bridge-style)

***

Your description of the appropriation of being an obstacle to spending the settlement funds is rather silly.  MD will get the money spent one way or another.

***

You know as well as I do that NEPA concluded with FHWA's determination that the project is a categorical exclusion which does not require an EIS.

***

At this point, given previous posts of yours when you knew and even emphasized that it was a categorical exclusion, I can only conclude that you're overtly trolling.  Again. 

[Beltway]

On 668.105 and 668.113:
Both sections are part of FHWA's Emergency Relief framework. They define ER eligibility and the requirement that damage recoveries be credited to the category of loss they compensated. That is why FHWA treats third‑party compensation as an offset to the ER category, not as new capital money. This is standard ER accounting practice: recoveries reduce the eligible ER amount; they do not become discretionary construction funds.

On the appropriation issue:
MDTA is a revenue‑bond authority. It cannot spend general‑fund settlement proceeds without a legislative appropriation, a bond resolution, and federal concurrence. That is how Maryland budget law works. Whether the legislature ultimately appropriates the money is irrelevant to the point: MDTA cannot spend it today.

On NEPA:
The July 2024 CE applies only to the ER‑eligible, in‑kind replacement scenario -- constructed entirely within the collapsed bridge's footprint, with no capacity increase and no geometric changes. The structure MDTA is now pursuing is a different design with a different footprint, which is why MDTA issued a Notice of Intent and is in the scoping phase for a full NEPA document. A project is "through NEPA" only when an EA or EIS is completed and a FONSI or Record of Decision is issued. None of those exist for the actual replacement bridge now being designed.

Bottom line:
The settlement is backward‑looking compensation for economic losses. The replacement bridge is a forward‑looking capital project that still requires NEPA, design, procurement, and a federal funding package that does not exist. The two cannot be merged under federal law.

On FHWA HQ vs. FHWA Maryland Division:
The July 2024 CE was issued by the FHWA Maryland Division under ER program authority for an in‑kind, within‑footprint replacement. FHWA Headquarters has not concurred with that CE as the governing NEPA document for the actual replacement bridge now being designed. That is why MDTA issued a Notice of Intent and is in the scoping phase for a full NEPA action. When HQ is aligned with a Division's CE on a megaproject, you see an immediate FONSI or ROD. Here, you see the opposite: HQ required a new NEPA process because the real project is not the CE‑approved in‑kind scenario.

FHWA Headquarters has been completely silent on the July 2024 CE, and that silence is telling. When HQ intends a Division‑issued CE to serve as the governing NEPA document for a major federal‑aid structure, they follow it with concurrence, a funding alignment, or a FONSI/ROD. None of that occurred here. After the CE was issued for the ER‑eligible in‑kind scenario, MDTA announced a different design and then issued a Notice of Intent -- which only happens when a new NEPA action is required. HQ didn't contradict the Division; they simply declined to adopt the CE and allowed the project to move into scoping.

FHWA divisions vary widely in how they interpret and apply federal regulations, and that variation tracks closely with the culture, priorities, and risk tolerance of the state DOT they oversee. FHWA is decentralized by design: each Division Administrator has broad discretion, and the day‑to‑day relationship with the state DOT shapes how aggressively or cautiously the division handles NEPA, ER eligibility, and CE classifications. That's why the Maryland Division's CE posture looks very different from how the same fact pattern would be handled in Florida, Pennsylvania, or Illinois, for example. The differences aren't theoretical -- they're structural.

FHWA Headquarters is the ultimate arbiter on a megaproject. Divisions can issue CEs, but on a multi‑billion‑dollar interstate structure, HQ either adopts the CE as the governing NEPA document or it doesn't. Here, HQ's silence is the signal: they did not adopt the July 2024 CE for the actual replacement bridge. That is why the project is in NOI/scoping. The CE remains valid only for the ER‑eligible in‑kind scenario; the new design requires its own NEPA process.

[Rothman]

Such verbosity does not hide the misinformation (e.g., MDTA has not issued a new NOI) and continued trolling.

This has become totally ridiculous.