Francis Scott Key Bridge (I-695) complete collapse after large ship hits it

[NE2]

Where is the AASHTO approval document I-695 MD 2024?
It doesn't seem to be available online or thru AI app searches.

Search here: https://grmservices.grmims.com/vsearch/portal/public/na4/aashto/default

I did use that interface . . . nothing found.

If I am ignorant then perhaps you can help me find it.

It's not working right now.

[Plutonic Panda]

Sorry I completely mentally checked out of this conversation in someone trying to say this bridge should be rebuilt as a tunnel?

[kphoger]

Where is the AASHTO approval document I-695 MD 2024?
It doesn't seem to be available online or thru AI app searches.

Search here: https://grmservices.grmims.com/vsearch/portal/public/na4/aashto/default

I did use that interface . . . nothing found.

If I am ignorant then perhaps you can help me find it.

It's not working right now.

When I search for {Route Number = 695} there, the application document for 'MD-I695 Spring 2024' is the second search result.  However, when I click on the 'View' icon, it tells me the database is inactive.

[Strider]

of a new freeway project that should be put thru a full NEPA EIS process.

Well, not sure what you're trying to accomplish here as nothing has been going your way.

Several posters have complained loudly.

As you may know, internet forums typically have a lurker-to-poster ratio of somewhere between 10:1 and 100:1 

Thank you for your concern.

Well, YOU and the posters complained in the wrong forum. Take it to MdTA. Carry on.

[Beltway]

Where is the AASHTO approval document I-695 MD 2024?
It doesn't seem to be available online or thru AI app searches.

Search here: https://grmservices.grmims.com/vsearch/portal/public/na4/aashto/default

I did use that interface . . . nothing found.
If I am ignorant then perhaps you can help me find it.

It's not working right now.

When I search for {Route Number = 695} there, the application document for 'MD-I695 Spring 2024' is the second search result.  However, when I click on the 'View' icon, it tells me the database is inactive.

Exactly -- that is what I got -- two days ago.

I hope they can get it up and running soon.

Their IT Support Center should be able to take care of it.

[Beltway]

Sorry I completely mentally checked out of this conversation in someone trying to say this bridge should be rebuilt as a tunnel?

A tunnel  was Maryland's own idea in the first place. The bridge was built on top of the earthen causeways that were built for where the land highway would transition thru portal into a harbor tunnel.

This was a direct copy from the online MdTA Francis Scott Key Bridge Fact Sheet in 2002. They no longer have a FSKB fact sheet on their website.

By the early 1960s, the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel (Interstate 895), the first crossing of Baltimore's Harbor, had reached its traffic capacity, and motorists encountered heavy congestion and delays almost daily during rush hours. The State Roads Commission, predecessor of the Maryland Transportation Authority, concluded there was a need for a second harbor crossing and began planning a single-tube tunnel under the Patapsco River, downstream from the Harbor Tunnel. The proposed site was between Hawkins Point and Sollers Point. Plans also were underway for a drawbridge over Curtis Creek to connect Hawkins Point to Sollers Point.

Contractors took borings of the harbor bottom in the spring of 1969. Bids for construction of the proposed tunnel were opened on July 30, 1970, but price proposals were substantially higher than the engineering estimates. Officials drafted alternative plans, including the concept of a four-lane bridge. The bridge, at an estimated cost of $110 million, represented the best alternative because it allowed for more traffic lanes and carried lower operating and maintenance costs than a tunnel.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

By author:
The Outer Harbor Crossing was planned as a two-lane freeway on four-lane right-of-way, with a single-tube two-lane 6,200-foot-long harbor tunnel. The two-lane freeway was placed under construction, the causeways (landfill for roadway across a water body) for the tunnel portals were built, and when the tunnel was advertised for construction in 1970, the bids received on July 30, 1970 were so high that it was determined that a four-lane high-level bridge could be built for about the same cost as the revised estimate for the tunnel project. So the bridge was built, well-known to motorists as the Francis Scott Key Bridge. The prime engineering consultant for the bridge's design was J. E. Greiner Co., Inc., of Baltimore, Maryland. Piers for the high-level approaches were constructed on the causeways and in the harbor. The bridge is 8,636 feet (1.6 miles) long, and the main span of the bridge consists of a continuous steel truss span with 185 feet of vertical navigational clearance and 1,200 feet of span length.

Both of those quotes are on this website article --

Francis Scott Key Bridge (Outer Harbor Crossing)
http://www.roadstothefuture.com/Balt_Outer_Harbor.html

[roadman65]

of a new freeway project that should be put thru a full NEPA EIS process.

Well, not sure what you're trying to accomplish here as nothing has been going your way.

Several posters have complained loudly.

As you may know, internet forums typically have a lurker-to-poster ratio of somewhere between 10:1 and 100:1 

Thank you for your concern.

Well, YOU and the posters complained in the wrong forum. Take it to MdTA. Carry on.

I' m surprised Rothman isn't part of this discussion.   

[vdeane]

of a new freeway project that should be put thru a full NEPA EIS process.

Well, not sure what you're trying to accomplish here as nothing has been going your way.

Several posters have complained loudly.

As you may know, internet forums typically have a lurker-to-poster ratio of somewhere between 10:1 and 100:1 

Thank you for your concern.

Are you claiming a "silent majority" agrees with you?

[jeffandnicole]

Are you claiming a "silent majority" agrees with you?

Going off topic for a moment...

They are considering building a light rail line in this area, which many people in most towns are against for various reasons.  Some of the towns the line will go thru had non-binding referendums. In all but one town, the results have been against the rail line. 

In one Facebook group that is in favor of the line, someone said that in the towns where it was voted against, that was just the people that voted.  Everyone that didn't vote probably would've voted for the line, so there's actually a majority in favor of it.

[Beltway]

Are you claiming a "silent majority" agrees with you?

Going off topic for a moment...
They are considering building a light rail line in this area, which many people in most towns are against for various reasons.  Some of the towns the line will go thru had non-binding referendums. In all but one town, the results have been against the rail line. 

In one Facebook group that is in favor of the line, someone said that in the towns where it was voted against, that was just the people that voted.  Everyone that didn't vote probably would've voted for the line, so there's actually a majority in favor of it.

New Jersey is another state that seems to have a high public tolerance for poor government agency performance. 

How long ago was it that we viewed this mess -- mid-2022?

The retaining wall collapse on I-295 in New Jersey, known as "Wall 22," occurred on March 25, 2021, as part of the Direct Connect project aimed at improving traffic flow between Route 42, I-295, and I-676. The collapse was attributed to multiple factors, including the use of inappropriate sand material, a faulty foundation, and high groundwater conditions exacerbated by heavy rain. Fortunately, the roadway was not open to traffic at the time, and no injuries were reported.

The incident has led to significant delays in the project's completion, now expected in 2028, and additional costs of $92 million. Efforts are underway to ensure similar issues don't occur in future projects.

The retaining wall on I-295 in New Jersey, which collapsed in 2021, is still under reconstruction. Work to replace the wall began in May 2023, with a new design that includes reinforced concrete and improved drainage systems.

[jeffandnicole]

...The incident has led to significant delays in the project's completion, now expected in 2028, and additional costs of $92 million...

Actually...2028 is just the expected ending of the current contract.  There's 4 contracts in total for the 295/76/42 project.  They are on Contract 3, which includes the 2nd attempt at that wall.  This contract will include building some of the 295 viaduct over 295, but not the entire viaduct. Only 295 North will be open over 76/42 when it's completed.

However, there's still a 4th contract, which will probably go out to bid around 2027 or 2028, and that will have another 4 - 5 years of building, which will include completing the 295 South viaduct over 76/42 and removal of the infamous Aljo Curve (the 35 mph loop for 295 South traffic).

Thus, the entire project won't be completed until about 2033...and that assumes no more delays!

(For anyone keeping tabs - the project originally started in 2013 and had a completion date of 2021. An 8 year project that will actually take about 20 years total)

[Scott5114]

Again, how can the probability of a catastrophic Black Swan Event be calculated?

It could be 50 years or it could be a day.

Or it could be 500 years or it could be never.

Maryland could do an EIS on what would happen if all the water in the Patapsco River were replaced by chocolate pudding, but that's not very likely to happen, so they're not doing one on that either.

[Beltway]

Again, how can the probability of a catastrophic Black Swan Event be calculated?
It could be 50 years or it could be a day.

Or it could be 500 years or it could be never.
Maryland could do an EIS on what would happen if all the water in the Patapsco River were replaced by chocolate pudding, but that's not very likely to happen, so they're not doing one on that either.

You're right that some scenarios are improbable, like the pudding analogy. But equating a hypothetical dessert-filled river with Black Swan Events isn't a fair comparison. These events, while rare, have precedent—consider the Titanic disaster, the Southern California wildfires, 9/11, or the global financial crisis. Preparing for such possibilities isn't about indulging in absurd hypotheticals; it's about acknowledging risks with real-world implications.

The purpose of considering catastrophic Black Swan Events isn't about pinpointing exact probabilities, but rather acknowledging their potential impact and ensuring preparedness for unlikely but highly consequential scenarios. While chocolate pudding replacing water is obviously absurd, Black Swan Events aren't necessarily so. They're rare, but history shows us they can and do occur. Doesn't prudence warrant some degree of consideration?

[vdeane]

Again, how can the probability of a catastrophic Black Swan Event be calculated?
It could be 50 years or it could be a day.

Or it could be 500 years or it could be never.
Maryland could do an EIS on what would happen if all the water in the Patapsco River were replaced by chocolate pudding, but that's not very likely to happen, so they're not doing one on that either.

You're right that some scenarios are improbable, like the pudding analogy. But equating a hypothetical dessert-filled river with Black Swan Events isn't a fair comparison. These events, while rare, have precedent—consider the Titanic disaster, the Southern California wildfires, 9/11, or the global financial crisis. Preparing for such possibilities isn't about indulging in absurd hypotheticals; it's about acknowledging risks with real-world implications.

The purpose of considering catastrophic Black Swan Events isn't about pinpointing exact probabilities, but rather acknowledging their potential impact and ensuring preparedness for unlikely but highly consequential scenarios. While chocolate pudding replacing water is obviously absurd, Black Swan Events aren't necessarily so. They're rare, but history shows us they can and do occur. Doesn't prudence warrant some degree of consideration?

9/11 is a good analogy here, specifically the way people reacted to it.  With everyone suddenly terrified of terrorism, we created the TSA and a long list of new security regulations, most of which are security theater.  You're like all the terrified people saying we needed to do that, and those of us arguing against you are like the people who would rather not have the security theater because the real changes that mattered were fortifying the cockpit doors and the change in how people respond to plane hijackings.  In this case there's a countermeasure to the ship strikes that this bridge did not have because retrofitting them onto older bridges is expensive, and you're saying that's not enough because you're terrified.

The fact of the matter is, all engineering projects come down to engineering calculations in the end.  You drawing the line and saying that ship impacts aren't acceptable to rely on them is arbitrary and capricious.

Incidentally, I'm now wondering if the only reason you came back is because of a Facebook mod getting tired of these arguments, because I'm not sure I've seen you do anything here since coming back other than air your grievances about the bridge being rebuilt and argue with those who don't agree with you.

[Max Rockatansky]

I'm really just tired of a loud minority in the hobby screaming for safety theater whenever some rare-type event like the Key Bridge collapse happens. 

I was wondering why I hadn't been seeing this safety stuff the last couple weeks on Facebook road groups.  I guess that I missed some mods taking some action to push back the tide.

[PColumbus73]

My position hasn't changed, which seems to be the overall consensus, which is invest in additional protections for bridge piers and research different devices that can stop or deflect an errant ship. Maybe even an emergency signal / barrier on the approaching lanes if a ship drifts outside the designated channel or signals a mayday.

Decreeing that bridge piers can't be built in waters deeper than 10-20 feet, and in the Key Bridge's case that the main span must be a mile long, with both piers on the shore, is unrealistic. The fact that there are less than 10 bridges in the worldwith a main span at least one mile long should be a clear indicator of the cost and difficulty of building such a bridge.

Yes, tunnels are also an option, but if I remember rightly, the Key Bridge was preferred as a hazmat bypass for the existing Baltimore tunnels. I'm sure than banning hazmat in tunnels is common enough that we can't simply replace a bridge with a tunnel, also with the increased costs of a tunnel over a bridge.

[Beltway]

First of all -- I have said nearly everything that I wanted to say about the outer harbor crossing alternatives issues that I see. And I have answered the several common questions that people raise.

What I said is already there for anyone to read and think about. I don't see the need to keep repeating what I said. So I don't plan to, and I have a busy life and don't want to spend much online.

The purpose of considering catastrophic Black Swan Events isn't about pinpointing exact probabilities, but rather acknowledging their potential impact and ensuring preparedness for unlikely but highly consequential scenarios. While chocolate pudding replacing water is obviously absurd, Black Swan Events aren't necessarily so. They're rare, but history shows us they can and do occur. Doesn't prudence warrant some degree of consideration?

9/11 is a good analogy here, specifically the way people reacted to it.  With everyone suddenly terrified of terrorism, we created the TSA and a long list of new security regulations, most of which are security theater.  You're like all the terrified people saying we needed to do that, and those of us arguing against you are like the people who would rather not have the security theater because the real changes that mattered were fortifying the cockpit doors and the change in how people respond to plane hijackings.  In this case there's a countermeasure to the ship strikes that this bridge did not have because retrofitting them onto older bridges is expensive, and you're saying that's not enough because you're terrified.

Your 9/11 analogy misses the mark. I'm not arguing from a place of terror but from a position of reason, advocating for practical solutions over symbolic gestures. You compare me to those who supported TSA, but I'm focused on effective, evidence-based countermeasures—like fortifying cockpit doors—not empty security theater. The Key Bridge lacked critical protections that newer bridges have, and retrofitting isn't just about cost; it's about prioritizing resources where they'll save lives. Dismissing that as fear-driven ignores the data: ship strikes are a known risk, and mitigation strategies exist.

Your stance seems to favor inaction, shrugging off preventable failures as inevitable. That's not bravery; it's negligence. We don't "need" to be terrified to demand better engineering and planning. If you'd rather mock concern than engage with solutions, that's your choice—but don't pretend it's the rational one. The real change here isn't about calming fears; it's about ensuring infrastructure keeps up with modern risks. I'll stick to facts over hyperbole.

The fact of the matter is, all engineering projects come down to engineering calculations in the end.  You drawing the line and saying that ship impacts aren't acceptable to rely on them is arbitrary and capricious.

Engineering calculations are the backbone of any project, sure—but they're only as good as the assumptions they're based on. Dismissing ship impacts as an acceptable risk isn't arbitrary; it's a judgment call rooted in real-world consequences, like the Key Bridge collapse. Relying on calculations to shrug off catastrophic failures ignores the human cost when those calculations fail. You're acting like every risk can be reduced to a spreadsheet, but bridges aren't just numbers—they're lifelines. Saying "it's acceptable" because the math says so is as capricious as ignoring the math entirely.

I'm not drawing lines in the sand; I'm pointing out where the lines already exist in safety standards and real-world failures. If you think engineering can solve everything without tough choices, you're the one being naive. Let's focus on solutions that actually protect people, not just balance equations.

Incidentally, I'm now wondering if the only reason you came back is because of a Facebook mod getting tired of these arguments, because I'm not sure I've seen you do anything here since coming back other than air your grievances about the bridge being rebuilt and argue with those who don't agree with you.

No mod/admin in any Facebook roads groups has confronted me about anything or limited my postings. Same with YouTube forums that discuss this topic.

It is just the last month or so that DOGE has hit stride to where they can handle confronting federal government issues and problems. There was no DOGE before Jan. 20th so the likelihood of changing anything back then was slim to none.

Now there are new developments. I have been in contact with several experts and federal officials, and there is a substantial probability that decisions will be revisited.

FHWA Maryland Division will likely be investigated and audited by other federal bodies concerning recent major problems with highway project oversight.

Excerpt from recent communication to me:
Your concern about the FHWA Maryland Division's performance could stem from their handling of the Key Bridge project, including the CATEX decision, lack of transparency, or perceived bias toward bridges over tunnels.

NEPA Process Efficiency vs. Thoroughness -- The division's reliance on CATEX might prioritize speed over safety, as seen in other Maryland projects like the I-495/I-270 Managed Lanes FEIS, where public groups criticized short review periods. This suggests a pattern of rushing environmental reviews, which could undermine safety and public trust.

Coordination with MDTA -- The FHWA Maryland Division works closely with MDTA, which may bias them toward state-preferred solutions (e.g., bridges) rather than federal safety standards. The Chesapeake Bay Crossing Study (Tier 1 EIS) shows they can handle complex reviews, but only when forced by law.

Response to Public Input -- Your experience of being ignored mirrors complaints in other projects (e.g., I-270/U.S. 15 study rescission in 2019), where FHWA Maryland faced criticism for poor public engagement.

If you find evidence of inefficiency or bias (e.g., CATEX misuse, ignored safety risks), report it to FHWA headquarters (202-366-4000) or the U.S. DOT Office of Inspector General. You could also alert DOGE, framing it as a failure to ensure cost-effective, safe infrastructure spending.

Use the cost-efficiency frame -- "The FHWA Maryland Division's CATEX decision and MDTA's bridge plan waste federal funds by ignoring safer, equally cost-effective tunnel alternatives proven at ports like Norfolk/Hampton Roads. DOGE should investigate and redirect funding to a feasibility study for a Patapsco tunnel, leveraging the 1970 design and HRBT and MMMBT data."

Challenge the CATEX -- Appeal to FHWA headquarters or U.S. DOT, arguing that the Key Bridge replacement's scale, safety risks, and public controversy (e.g., your forums, NTSB findings) warrant a full EIS. Cite 40 CFR 1508.4 and FHWA's own guidance on extraordinary circumstances.

Monitor FHWA Performance -- Track their recent projects (e.g., Chesapeake Bay Crossing, I-495/I-270) for patterns of rushed reviews or poor public engagement. Use this to build a case for oversight reform, potentially involving Congress or GAO.
End of excerpt from recent communication to me.

See my topmost comments about my strategies regarding this group.

[vdeane]

Your 9/11 analogy misses the mark. I'm not arguing from a place of terror but from a position of reason, advocating for practical solutions over symbolic gestures. You compare me to those who supported TSA, but I'm focused on effective, evidence-based countermeasures—like fortifying cockpit doors—not empty security theater. The Key Bridge lacked critical protections that newer bridges have, and retrofitting isn't just about cost; it's about prioritizing resources where they'll save lives. Dismissing that as fear-driven ignores the data: ship strikes are a known risk, and mitigation strategies exist.

Your stance seems to favor inaction, shrugging off preventable failures as inevitable. That's not bravery; it's negligence. We don't "need" to be terrified to demand better engineering and planning. If you'd rather mock concern than engage with solutions, that's your choice—but don't pretend it's the rational one. The real change here isn't about calming fears; it's about ensuring infrastructure keeps up with modern risks. I'll stick to facts over hyperbole.

The fact of the matter is, all engineering projects come down to engineering calculations in the end.  You drawing the line and saying that ship impacts aren't acceptable to rely on them is arbitrary and capricious.

Engineering calculations are the backbone of any project, sure—but they're only as good as the assumptions they're based on. Dismissing ship impacts as an acceptable risk isn't arbitrary; it's a judgment call rooted in real-world consequences, like the Key Bridge collapse. Relying on calculations to shrug off catastrophic failures ignores the human cost when those calculations fail. You're acting like every risk can be reduced to a spreadsheet, but bridges aren't just numbers—they're lifelines. Saying "it's acceptable" because the math says so is as capricious as ignoring the math entirely.

I'm not drawing lines in the sand; I'm pointing out where the lines already exist in safety standards and real-world failures. If you think engineering can solve everything without tough choices, you're the one being naive. Let's focus on solutions that actually protect people, not just balance equations.

I feel like you're changing your position here and mischaracterizing mine.  You had previously been expressing doubt over the modern countermeasures for ship collisions that have been in use for the past 30 years or so (in other words, my entire life), saying that they're "unproven" because a ship hasn't rammed into them at full speed and are therefore unsafe and that the only acceptable solution is to keep all piers out of anything that can be traversed by anything bigger than a yacht or build a tunnel instead.  Now you're trying to claim that modern countermeasures are fine and that I'm saying that a simple "replace in kind" of what the old Key Bridge had as far as piers is concerned is fine.  I'm not sure why you'd assume that the new bridge would lack modern countermeasures and replicate a design from before ship collisions were accounted for.  I'm also not sure where you got inaction from - inaction would be not replacing the bridge, which you seem to prefer over the current rebuild.

If you can't be bothered to argue in good faith, then please kindly stop arguing at all.

[Max Rockatansky]

If I'm getting this right Beltway is trying to invoke DOGE into doing something under the premise that somehow the Key Bridge crossing doesn't carry national importance?  How is this fictional tunnel concept supposedly happening without Federal contributions? 

[PColumbus73]

If I'm getting this right Beltway is trying to invoke DOGE into doing something under the premise that somehow the Key Bridge crossing doesn't carry national importance?  How is this fictional tunnel concept supposedly happening without Federal contributions? 

... and why wouldn't those angry letters / emails / phone calls be directed to the USDOT or FHWA

... and if his location is accurate, Maryland doesn't have an incentive to respond. They could if they wanted to be nice, but expecting a job like this to come to a complete halt... yeah, no...

[Max Rockatansky]

If I'm getting this right Beltway is trying to invoke DOGE into doing something under the premise that somehow the Key Bridge crossing doesn't carry national importance?  How is this fictional tunnel concept supposedly happening without Federal contributions? 

... and why wouldn't those angry letters / emails / phone calls be directed to the USDOT or FHWA

... and if his location is accurate, Maryland doesn't have an incentive to respond. They could if they wanted to be nice, but expecting a job like this to come to a complete halt... yeah, no...

I can probably take a couple guesses about USDOT and the FHWA but I'll let Beltway explain himself. 

The most "efficient thing" for the Feds to do is to is provide funding contributions to the cheapest option (a span similar to the Key Bridge) or not provide anything.  I'm not understanding the premise of how this is supposedly more efficient for the Federal side to spend way more money on a tunnel?

[Beltway]

I feel like you're changing your position here and mischaracterizing mine.  You had previously been expressing doubt over the modern countermeasures for ship collisions that have been in use for the past 30 years or so (in other words, my entire life), saying that they're "unproven" because a ship hasn't rammed into them at full speed and are therefore unsafe and that the only acceptable solution is to keep all piers out of anything that can be traversed by anything bigger than a yacht or build a tunnel instead.  Now you're trying to claim that modern countermeasures are fine and that I'm saying that a simple "replace in kind" of what the old Key Bridge had as far as piers is concerned is fine.  I'm not sure why you'd assume that the new bridge would lack modern countermeasures and replicate a design from before ship collisions were accounted for.  I'm also not sure where you got inaction from - inaction would be not replacing the bridge, which you seem to prefer over the current rebuild.

If you can't be bothered to argue in good faith, then please kindly stop arguing at all.

You're misreading me—I haven't shifted positions. I've consistently said modern countermeasures, like fender systems or deeper pier placements, need rigorous testing because unproven designs under full-force impacts (like a 100,000-ton ship) are risky, as the Key Bridge showed. I'm not against rebuilding; I'm against half-measures. You seem to think "replace in kind" with today's tech is enough, but if the new design doesn't exceed past failures, it's still gambling with hundreds of lives and billion of dollars of economic losses.

Inaction isn't my preference—it's rushing a suboptimal fix. Tunnels, or at least proven protections like longer main spans, aren't just whims; they're responses to real data, like VDOT's and CBBTD's approach. I'm arguing in good faith by prioritizing safety over assumptions. If you think current plans are foolproof, the burden's on you to prove it, not dismiss concerns as obstruction.

[jeffandnicole]

If I'm getting this right Beltway is trying to invoke DOGE into doing something under the premise that somehow the Key Bridge crossing doesn't carry national importance?  How is this fictional tunnel concept supposedly happening without Federal contributions? 

... and why wouldn't those angry letters / emails / phone calls be directed to the USDOT or FHWA

... and if his location is accurate, Maryland doesn't have an incentive to respond. They could if they wanted to be nice, but expecting a job like this to come to a complete halt... yeah, no...

I can probably take a couple guesses about USDOT and the FHWA but I'll let Beltway explain himself. 

The most "efficient thing" for the Feds to do is to is provide funding contributions to the cheapest option (a span similar to the Key Bridge) or not provide anything.  I'm not understanding the premise of how this is supposedly more efficient for the Federal side to spend way more money on a tunnel?

We have no idea which "experts" and "federal officials" he's been in contact with, but looking thru the claimed responses, they are strangely in the exact same opinion of Beltway's stance.  I imagine he's just talking to a friend of a government agency with like-minded thoughts.  Also, likely someone that has absolutely no say in these types of projects and someone who doesn't exactly want to get involved, as they keep telling Beltway what he can do on his own. 

None of this suggests Maryland is going to be audited or investigated. 

This response is especially odd: "Coordination with MDTA -- The FHWA Maryland Division works closely with MDTA, which may bias them toward state-preferred solutions (e.g., bridges) rather than federal safety standards."  Why would a Federal Agency ignore their own safety standards?  Wouldn't any FHWA Division work closely with the entity they're responsible to work with?  They would do so to confirm a project meets the standards.  If they give approval for any deviations, it'll be documented why.

He ain't gonna get anywhere with DOGE...being the bias is his own; not the transportation or federal departments involved.

[Beltway]

This response is especially odd: "Coordination with MDTA -- The FHWA Maryland Division works closely with MDTA, which may bias them toward state-preferred solutions (e.g., bridges) rather than federal safety standards."  Why would a Federal Agency ignore their own safety standards?  Wouldn't any FHWA Division work closely with the entity they're responsible to work with?  They would do so to confirm a project meets the standards.  If they give approval for any deviations, it'll be documented why.

I worked for the government for 44 years.

You have far more confidence in governments than I do.

[vdeane]

I feel like you're changing your position here and mischaracterizing mine.  You had previously been expressing doubt over the modern countermeasures for ship collisions that have been in use for the past 30 years or so (in other words, my entire life), saying that they're "unproven" because a ship hasn't rammed into them at full speed and are therefore unsafe and that the only acceptable solution is to keep all piers out of anything that can be traversed by anything bigger than a yacht or build a tunnel instead.  Now you're trying to claim that modern countermeasures are fine and that I'm saying that a simple "replace in kind" of what the old Key Bridge had as far as piers is concerned is fine.  I'm not sure why you'd assume that the new bridge would lack modern countermeasures and replicate a design from before ship collisions were accounted for.  I'm also not sure where you got inaction from - inaction would be not replacing the bridge, which you seem to prefer over the current rebuild.

If you can't be bothered to argue in good faith, then please kindly stop arguing at all.

You're misreading me—I haven't shifted positions. I've consistently said modern countermeasures, like fender systems or deeper pier placements, need rigorous testing because unproven designs under full-force impacts (like a 100,000-ton ship) are risky, as the Key Bridge showed. I'm not against rebuilding; I'm against half-measures. You seem to think "replace in kind" with today's tech is enough, but if the new design doesn't exceed past failures, it's still gambling with hundreds of lives and billion of dollars of economic losses.

Inaction isn't my preference—it's rushing a suboptimal fix. Tunnels, or at least proven protections like longer main spans, aren't just whims; they're responses to real data, like VDOT's and CBBTD's approach. I'm arguing in good faith by prioritizing safety over assumptions. If you think current plans are foolproof, the burden's on you to prove it, not dismiss concerns as obstruction.

And now you've circled back around to doubting modern safety measures.  Given that the old Key Bridge predated the modern safety features, I would say that the ship collision says nothing about them, which is why your questioning of them is so perplexing to everyone here and on Facebook.

Honestly, at this point, it's starting to feel like we're not even debating from the same set of facts.  Not to mention that it's starting to feel like your issue is a lot more political than you've been saying, especially as you've now revealed that your grievance isn't even limited to this project.

None of this suggests Maryland is going to be audited or investigated. 

This response is especially odd: "Coordination with MDTA -- The FHWA Maryland Division works closely with MDTA, which may bias them toward state-preferred solutions (e.g., bridges) rather than federal safety standards."  Why would a Federal Agency ignore their own safety standards?  Wouldn't any FHWA Division work closely with the entity they're responsible to work with?  They would do so to confirm a project meets the standards.  If they give approval for any deviations, it'll be documented why.

He ain't gonna get anywhere with DOGE...being the bias is his own; not the transportation or federal departments involved.

Nobody ever said that logic is a factor in DOGE (well, nobody who isn't biased, anyways).  But with all the resignations of federal employees as of late, I can't help but wonder if there's even going to be a Maryland division of FHWA to be investigated by the time all is said and done.  Rumor has it that some states had their entire divisions accept the "deferred resignation".