Francis Scott Key Bridge (I-695) complete collapse after large ship hits it

[Beltway]

Baloney is a reserved word on the Internet
    (Robert Coté, 2002)

[kphoger]

Dost thou understand the graveness of the circumstances?

[LilianaUwU]

"Volcano with no fire... Not volcano... Just mountain."
—Mr. Thwomp

[NE2]

I accept and respect your identity as long as it's not dumb shit like "identifying as a vaccinated attack helicopter".

[Scott5114]

A guy did that on the Usenet misc.transport.road newsgroup back in the day.

Which was the style at the time. Now, to take the Key Bridge cost a nickel, and in those days, nickels had pictures of bumblebees on 'em. "Gimme five bees for a quarter," you'd say. Now where were we? Oh, yeah. The important thing was a guy on misc.transport.road was creatively snipping one-liners, which was the style at the time.

Oh, uh, I mean, uncontrollable freak sardine salad chef.

[Takumi]

Don't @ me. Seriously.

[Beltway]

The issue isn't that Maryland government failed to tell the Coast Guard what to do — it's that no one acted on clear red flags that should've stopped the ship from moving at all.

The Dali experienced multiple power failures before departure. Allowing a vessel with unresolved electrical faults to navigate near critical infrastructure was a clear risk.

DOJ alleges the ship's systems were configured in a way that prevented quick recovery of propulsion and steering after a power outage — a cascading failure waiting to happen.

The Coast Guard's Certificate of Inspection may not have reflected the ship's actual condition. If Maryland or port authorities had flagged the vessel's issues, they could have requested a port state control inspection or delayed departure.

The Port of Baltimore had the authority to hold the vessel at the dock if it posed a safety risk to infrastructure or navigation.

The Key Bridge was known to be structurally vulnerable to vessel strikes. Allowing a compromised ship to pass beneath it — especially at night — was a high-stakes gamble.

No tug escort was required, despite the ship's size and the narrow channel. That's a procedural oversight that could've mitigated the risk.

The Coast Guard doesn't operate in a vacuum. It relies on local intelligence, including reports from state agencies, pilots, and port staff.

If Maryland had flagged the Dali's condition, the Coast Guard could have acted. The absence of such a warning reflects a breakdown in local vigilance, not a lack of jurisdiction.

Maryland didn't need to "tell the Coast Guard to do their job better." But they did have a duty to monitor, report, and mitigate risks — especially with a bridge that had no margin for error.

The Dali had documented electrical problems before leaving port. That's now part of federal investigations. With power failures already occurring dockside, allowing a vessel of that scale to sail — especially without a tug escort — was reckless oversight. MPA rolled the dice and they got snake eyes -- the casino won and MPA lost.

Maryland port authorities didn't need to diagnose the faults themselves. But they absolutely had the ability — and the responsibility — to delay departure, request a Port State Control inspection, or escalate concerns to the Coast Guard. The state isn't just a spectator here.

The Coast Guard depends on local agencies to raise alarms when something's off. If no one flagged the Dali, it wasn't a federal breakdown — it was a failure in basic vigilance.

Maryland Port Administration (MPA) didn't cause the power failure aboard the Dali, but they were part of a system that let a compromised vessel proceed. When you're managing terminal operations, you're not just coordinating ship movements — you're gatekeeping risk. The moment repeated electrical faults occurred, MPA had options: delay departure, escalate to the Coast Guard, demand tug support. None were used.

So yes — MPA rolled the dice on a ship limping out of port with questionable reliability. And instead of a routine crossing, they got a collapsed bridge, paralyzed supply chains, and a national infrastructure failure.

[jeffandnicole]

So yes — MPA rolled the dice on a ship limping out of port with questionable reliability. And instead of a routine crossing, they got a... paralyzed supply chains...

List what has been paralyzed.

Inconvenienced? Fo Sho. But trucks can still move around.

Want to permanently inconvenience those supply chains? Build a tunnel.

[Beltway]

So yes — MPA rolled the dice on a ship limping out of port with questionable reliability. And instead of a routine crossing, they got a... paralyzed supply chains...

List what has been paralyzed.
Inconvenienced? Fo Sho. But trucks can still move around.
Want to permanently inconvenience those supply chains? Build a tunnel.

Really?

Norfolk/Hampton Roads has permanently inconvenienced supply chains?

Modern era tunnels are designed to allow hazardous cargos. Many world ports don't allow bridges across shipping channels and there needs to be a way to transport those highway cargoes.

The VA I-664 Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel (MMMBT) was designed with the clearances and safety systems so that nearly all hazardous materials can use it, including RVs with standard propane tanks, including gasoline tanker trucks. That was opened in 1992.

An outer harbor tunnel could likewise be designed with the clearances and safety systems to handle nearly all hazardous materials.

Notice – all this talk about HAZMAT that constantly comes up on various forums that discuss this bridge. The best data I can find is that the AADT was about 32,000 with 10% large trucks with about 10% of the shipments being material that MDTA won't allow thru the tunnels.

So about 300 to 350 shipments per day. To me that is very little justification for spending $2 billion to avoid tunnels; granted there were the other 31,000 vehicles. But the two Interstate highway cross-harbor tunnels carry the 225,000 AADT now and have a total of 12 lanes.

That is about the same AADT as the I-495 American Legion Bridge which has 8 thru lanes. The Key Bridge had 1/7 of that traffic and Maryland is doing nothing to expand the ALB and the rest of I-495 between VA and I-270 to the VA 12-lane cross-section (4-2-2-4) with HOT lanes.

How about creative thinking? Like right now, allowing HAZMAT shipments say between 1:00 am and 5:00 am, with escort vehicles.  Seems like creative thinking ends as you sail north across the VA/MD border on Chesapeake Bay.

I could and may take the time to list all the major ports that have no bridge between the deep water port and the ocean. A few --

Hamburg (tunnel), Copenhagen (tunnel between city and entire Baltic Sea, no crossings between the city and the ocean), Rotterdam (tunnel), Tokyo (bridge-tunnel) and Osaka immediately come to mind.

The Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line (東京湾アクアライン) is a 8.9 mile long bridge-tunnel and the tunnel is 5.8 miles long. It crosses Tokyo Bay between the ocean and the deep water ports in the upper bay.

Tokyo has 9 short highway underwater tunnels and virtually all of the inner harbor and river docks are accessible without passing under a bridge.

None of those latter ports have any navy justifications to speak of -- and they don't have  permanently inconvenienced supply chains.

[Max Rockatansky]

The only thing collapsing in this thread is basic paragraph structure.

[Rothman]

The only thing collapsing in this thread is basic paragraph structure.

I don't know.  The amount of misinformation is pretty staggering as well.

[kphoger]

The issue isn't that ...

Thank you.  That was very well explained, I think I now understand your position better, and your post has served to convince me of it more than I had been.